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Abstract________________________________________________________________ 
During emerging market crises, government interest rate spreads rise, the debt maturity 
shortens and the spread on short-term bonds is higher than on long-term bonds. This paper 
studies the maturity composition of debt in a dynamic model with endogenous default, in 
which the price of debt compensates for the risk-adjusted losses from default. Short-term 
debt is better at inducing repayment because it does not require savings in the near future for 
repaying in the far future. Hence, short-term debt can raise more resources than long-term 
debt. However, issuing long-term debt provides a hedge against the need to roll-over short-
term debt at high interest rate spreads. The trade-off between these two benefits is 
quantitatively important for understanding the maturity composition in emerging markets. 
When calibrated to data from Brazil, the model matches the dynamics in the maturity of 
debt issuances and its comovement with the level of spreads across maturities. 
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Debt crises in emerging economies are often blamed on governments borrowing large amounts
of short-term debt in international capital markets. Short-term borrowing leaves an economy
with large amounts of debt to roll over, which becomes diﬃcult when interest rates rise and
access to external credit is restricted. This idea has motivated several recent empirical studies
on debt and ﬁnancial crises. For example, Rodrik and Velasco (2003) show, using evidence
from a broad set of countries, that a high level of short-term foreign debt increases the
likelihood of a crisis.1 From this ex post point of view, it seems desirable to implement
policies that would lengthen the maturity structure of emerging market economies’ external
liabilities. However, as documented by Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008), emerging
market governments actively shift to shorter-maturity debt in a crisis and issue long-term
debt in normal times. While this pattern may leave countries more exposed to roll-over crises
in bad times, it suggests that there must be some beneﬁts, ex ante, of shortening the maturity
structure of debt precisely in such times. By the same token, the beneﬁts of long-term debt
must outweigh those of short-term debt in normal times.
In this paper, we develop a model of sovereign debt in which the borrower endogenously
chooses a time-varying maturity structure of debt. The model accounts for the following
observation in the data: when interest rate spreads rise, the short-term spread rises more
than the long-term spread, while the maturity of newly issued debt shortens. Bond prices
reﬂect the risk adjusted loss in case of default and are jointly determined along with the
maturity structure of debt. Hence, we examine the maturity choice in a framework with
realistic predictions for the term structure of interest rate spreads. Our model can rationalize
shorter debt maturity during crises as the result of a liquidity advantage in short-term debt
contracts; although these contracts carry higher spreads than longer term debt, they can
deliver more resources to the country in times of high default risk.
We present data on prices and issuances of foreign-currency denominated bonds for four
emerging market countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia. We estimate spread
curves — interest rate spreads over U.S. Treasury bonds across maturity — as well as the
duration of bonds issued — a measure of the average time to maturity of payments on coupon-
paying bonds. Across these four countries, within periods in which 2-year spreads are below
their 25th percentile, the average duration of new debt is 7.1 years, and the average diﬀerence
1Other detailed studies on individual cases include Calvo and Mendoza (1996) for Mexico; Radelet and
Sachs (1998) for the East Asian economies; and Bevilaqua and Garcia (2002) for Brazil. Cole and Kehoe
(1996) use a model of self-fulﬁlling crises to argue that the 1994 Mexican debt crisis could have been avoided
if the maturity of government debt had been longer.
2between the 10-year spread and the 2-year spread — the slope of the spread curve — is 2.3
percentage points. But when the 2-year spreads are above their 75th percentile, the average
duration shortens to 5.7 years, while the slope of the spread curve is −0.5 percentage points.
From this evidence we conclude that the maturity of debt shortens in times of high spreads
and downward-sloping spread curves.
In our model, a borrower faces persistent income shocks and can issue long and short
duration bonds. The borrower can default on debt at any point in time, but faces costs of
doing so, in the form of lower income and exclusion from international ﬁnancial markets. In
equilibrium, default tends to occur in low-income, high-debt times, when the cost of debt
payments outweighs the costs of default. Bond prices compensate for the expected loss from
d e f a u l ta sw e l la sf o rr i s kp r e m i a .
Our model generates the dynamics of spread curves observed in the data because the
endogenous probability of repayment is persistent, yet mean reverting, as a result of the
dynamics of debt and income. In times of low debt and high income, default is unlikely in
the near future, so spreads are low. Long-term spreads are higher than short-term spreads
because default may become likely in the far future if the borrower receives a sequence of
bad shocks and accumulates debt. Long-term spreads are also higher because of the risk
premium on future changes in default probabilities. Conversely, in times of low income and
high debt, default is likely in the near future, so spreads are high. Long-term spreads rise
less than short-term spreads because the borrower’s likelihood of repaying may rise over a
longer time horizon if a sequence of good shocks occurs and debt is reduced.
We calibrate the model to Brazil and ﬁnd that it ﬁts the observed dynamics of spreads
well. When the spread on 2-year debt is below its 25th percentile, the 10-year spread is
on average 2 percentage points higher than the 2-year spread, compared to a slope of 3
percentage points in Brazil. In periods when the 2-year spread is above its 75th percentile,
t h es l o p eo ft h es p r e a dc u r v ei nt h em o d e li n v e r t st o−0.9 percentage points, compared to −1.5
percentage points in Brazil. We also use the model to decompose spreads into actuarially fair
compensation for default and risk premia. We ﬁnd that risk premia account for a substantial
portion of the spread in periods of low spreads, but that the majority of the changes in
spreads are accounted for by the dynamics of the default probability. For example, the risk
premium accounts on for one third of the 2-year spread when 2-year spreads are below their
25th percentile, but only for ﬁve percent when 2-year spreads are above their 75th percentile.
In addition, the risk premium on long-term debt is always higher than on short-term debt,
reﬂecting the fact that the risk premium is cumulated over a longer horizon. This allows the
model to generate an average slope of the spread curve of about 1 percentage point, compared
3to 1.5 percentage points in the Brazilian data.
The maturity structure of debt in the model reﬂects a trade-oﬀ between liquidity beneﬁts
of short-term debt and hedging beneﬁts of long-term debt, both due to the presence of default.
Short-term debt is a more liquid asset in the sense that consumption can be increased more
eﬀectively with short-term debt than with long-term debt. Issuing short-term debt induces
the borrower to repay income in the near future to avoid the costs of defaulting. In contrast,
the borrower cannot commit to saving suﬃciently to repay long-term debt, so consumption
cannot be raised as much with long-term debt.
Despite its liquidity beneﬁts, short-term debt is risky, in the sense that rolling over a
lot of short-term debt is expensive in future states with high interest rate spreads. Issuing
long-term debt provides a hedge, because its value falls in bad states more than the value
of short-term debt. This lowers the total debt burden in bad states relative to good states,
eﬀectively transferring resources across states in future periods. The value of outstanding
long-term debt reﬂects cumulative risk-adjusted default probabilities over a longer horizon,
so it is more sensitive to changes in default risk than the value of short-term debt.
The time-varying maturity structure in the model is a result of the time-varying valuation
of the liquidity beneﬁt of short-term debt and the hedging beneﬁt of long-term debt. Periods
of low default probabilities and upward-sloping spread curves correspond to states when the
borrower is wealthy and values the hedging beneﬁt that long-term debt provides. Thus, the
portfolio is shifted toward long debt. Periods of high default probabilities and inverted spread
curves correspond to states when the borrower is poor and credit is limited. These are times
when liquidity is most valuable, and thus the portfolio is shifted toward shorter-term debt.
In these periods, the average duration of debt is about 2.4 years shorter than in periods
with low spreads, compared to a diﬀerence of about 1.7 years in Brazil. We can therefore
rationalize higher short-term debt positions in times of crises as an optimal response to the
illiquidity of long-term debt, and the tighter availability of its supply.
Risk premia in bond prices have substantial eﬀects on default probabilities and the ma-
turity of debt. In a counterfactual exercise, we ﬁnd that raising risk premia makes borrowing
more costly, which results in lower default probabilities in equilibrium. High risk premia
also shorten the maturity of debt because they disproportionately raise the cost of issuing
long-term debt.
Related Literature
Several recent papers study the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Jeanne (2009) argues
that short-term debt gives incentives for sovereign governments to implement creditor-friendly
4policies, because creditors can discipline the government by rolling over the debt only after
desired policies are implemented. In our model, short-term debt also plays a role in inducing
the government to repay when it lacks the ability to commit to repayment. Relative to
Jeanne (2009), we consider why debt maturity shortens in times of high spreads. Broner,
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008) argue that emerging markets shift to short-term debt in
a crisis because shocks to lenders’ risk aversion raise the risk premium on long-term bonds
more than on short-term bonds. In our model, we allow for time-varying risk premia, but
the lenders’ degree of risk aversion ﬂuctuates with the borrower’s income, instead of being
driven by independent shocks.2
The mechanisms in our model build on two strands of the corporate ﬁnance literature.
First, the basic tradeoﬀ between issuing short-term and long-term debt in our model is
similar to that discussed by Hart and Moore (1989, 1994). They develop a model in which
an entrepreneur who cannot commit to repay seeks ﬁnancing for a project from a lender.3
In addition, our results on the term structure of spreads mirror those derived in Merton
(1974) for credit spread curves on defaultable corporate bonds. Our framework diﬀers from
Merton’s in that the probability of default and the level and maturity composition of debt
issuances are endogenous.
This paper is also related to the literature on the optimal maturity structure of government
debt in closed economies. Angeletos (2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004) and Shin (2007) show
that, when debt is not state contingent, a rich maturity structure of government bonds
can be used to replicate the allocations obtained with state-contingent debt in economies
with distortionary taxes as in Lucas and Stokey (1983). In these models, short- and long-
term interest rate dynamics reﬂect the variation in the representative agent’s marginal rate
of substitution, which changes with the state of the economy. Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin
(2006) show that higher interest rates on long-term debt relative to short-term debt reﬂect
an insurance premium paid by the government for the beneﬁts long-term debt provides
in hedging against future shocks. Our paper shares with these papers the message that
managing the maturity composition of debt can provide beneﬁts to the government because
of ﬂuctuations in future interest rates.4
The model in this paper builds on the work of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano
2Bi (2007) and Niepelt (2009) present dynamic models focusing on other mechanisms. Bi shows how short-
term debt reduces the value of outstanding long-term debt, while Niepelt focuses on smoothing borrowing
costs across maturities.
3Diamond (1991) emphasizes a similar tradeoﬀ in a model in which borrowers have private information
over their future default risk.
4Neumeyer and Perri (2005) have shown that emerging markets face substantial ﬂuctuations in interest
rate spreads, which makes hedging interest rate ﬂuctuations particularly useful.
5(2008), who model equilibrium default with incomplete markets, as in the seminal paper
on sovereign debt by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). To connect our model to the data, we
extend this framework to incorporate long debt of multiple maturities, rather than one-
period debt as in these earlier papers, as well as a ﬂexible pricing kernel that allows for risk
premia in bond prices. In recent work, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009) and Hatchondo and
Martinez (2009) show that models with a single long-term defaultable bond allow a better ﬁt
of emerging market data in terms of the volatility and mean of the country spread as well as
debt levels. In addition, Borri and Verdelhan (2009) show that risk premia help to explain
the variation of spreads across emerging markets with similar default probabilities.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents data on the dynamics of the
spread curve and maturity composition for four emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
and Russia. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 presents some examples to
illustrate the mechanisms that determine the optimal debt portfolio. Section 5 presents all
the quantitative results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Emerging Markets Bond Data
We examine data on sovereign bonds issued in international ﬁnancial markets by four emerging-
market countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia. We look at the behavior of the
interest rate spreads over default-free bonds, across diﬀerent maturities, and at the way the
maturity of new debt issued covaries with spreads. We ﬁnd that when spreads are low, govern-
ments issue long-term bonds more heavily and long-term spreads are higher than short-term
spreads. When spreads rise, the maturity of bond issuances shortens and short-term spreads
are higher than long-term spreads. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the earlier results of Broner, Loren-
zoni, and Schmukler (2008), who showed in a sample of eight emerging economies that debt
maturity shortens when spreads are very high.5
2.1 Spread Curves
We deﬁne the n-year spread for an emerging market country as the diﬀerence between the
yield on a defaultable, zero-coupon bond maturing in n years issued by the country and on
a zero-coupon bond of the same maturity with negligible default risk (for example, a U.S.
5Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2008) focus on the relationship between the term structure of excess
returns and the average maturity of debt. In this section we construct measures of the term structure of
yield spreads and the average duration of debt because these statistics provide the basis for the quantitative
assessment of our model.
6Treasury note). The spread is the implicit interest rate premium required by investors to be
willing to purchase a defaultable bond of a given maturity. The spread curve depicts spreads
as a function of maturity.
We denote the continuously compounded yield at date t on a zero-coupon bond issued
by country i,m a t u r i n gi nn years, as rn
t,i. The yield is related to the price pn
t,i of an n-year
zero-coupon bond, with face value 1, through
p
n
t,i =e x p ( −n × r
n
t,i). (1)
The n-year spread for country i at date t is given by: sn
t,i = rn
t,i − rn
t,rf,w h e r ern
t,rf is the
yield of a n-year default-free bond.6
Since governments do not issue zero-coupon bonds in a wide range of maturities, we
estimate a country’s spread curve by using secondary market data on the prices at which
coupon-bearing bonds trade. The estimation procedure consists of choosing a functional
form for the spread curve to ﬁt the discounted value of coupon payments to prices, following
Svensson (1994) and Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008). We describe this procedure
further in the Appendix and illustrate that the resulting pricing errors are small.
We compute spreads starting in March 1996 at the earliest and ending in May 2004 at the
latest, depending on the availability of data for each country. Figure 1 displays the estimated
spreads for 2-year and 10-year bonds for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia.
Spreads are very volatile, and the diﬀerence between long-term and short-term spreads
varies substantially over time. When spreads are low, long-term spreads are generally higher
than short-term spreads. However, when the level of spreads rises, the gap between long
and short-term spreads tends to narrow and sometimes reverses: the spread curve ﬂattens or
inverts. The time series in Figure 1 show sharp increases in interest rate spreads associated
with Russia’s default in 1998, Argentina’s default in 2001, and Brazil’s ﬁnancial crisis in
2002.7 The expectation that the countries would default in these episodes is reﬂe c t e di nt h e
high spreads charged on defaultable bonds.
To emphasize the pattern observed in the time series that short-term spreads tend to rise
more than long-term spreads, in Figure 2 we display spread curves averaged across diﬀerent
6Our data include bonds denominated in U.S. dollars and European currencies, so we take U.S. and
Euro-area government bond yields as default-free.
7For Argentina and Russia, we do not report spreads after default on external debt, unless a restructuring
agreement was largely completed at a later date. We use dates taken from Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2005). For Argentina, we report spreads until the last week of December 2001, when the country defaulted.
The restructuring agreement for external debt was not oﬀered until 2005. For Russia, we report spreads until
the second week of August 1998 and beginning again after August 2000 when 75% of external debt had been
restructured.




















































































Figure 1: Time Series of Short and Long Spreads
time periods for each country: the overall average, the average within periods with the 2-year
spread below its 10th percentile, and the average within periods with the 2-year spread above
its 90th percentile. When spreads are low, the spread curve is upward sloping: long-term
spreads are higher than short-term spreads. When spreads are high, short-term spreads rise
more than long-term spreads. For Argentina, Brazil, and Russia, the spread curve becomes
downward sloping in these times. For Mexico, which had relatively smaller increases in
spreads during this time period, the spread curve ﬂattens as short spreads rise more than
long spreads.8
2.2 The Maturity Composition of Debt and Spreads
We now examine the maturity of new debt issued by the four emerging market economies
during the sample period, and relate the changes in the maturity of debt to changes in
8The ﬁndings are similar to empirical ﬁndings on spread curves in corporate debt markets. Sarig and
Warga (1989), for example, ﬁnd that highly rated corporate bonds have low levels of spreads, and spread
curves that are ﬂat or upward-sloping, while low-grade corporate bonds have high levels of spreads, and
average spread curves that are hump-shaped or downward-sloping.













































































Figure 2: Spread Curves
spreads.9
In each week in the sample, we measure the maturity of debt as a quantity-weighted
average maturity of bonds issued that week. We measure the maturity of a bond using two
alternative statistics. The ﬁrst is simply the number of years from the issue date until the
maturity date. The second is the bond’s duration,d e ﬁned in Macaulay (1938) as a weighted
average of the number of years until each of the bond’s future payments. A bond issued at
date t by country i,p a y i n ga n n u a lc o u p o nc at dates n1,n 2,...n J years into the future, and














9In addition to external bond debt, emerging countries also have debt obligations with multilateral
institutions and foreign banks. However, marketable debt constitutes a large fraction of the external debt.
The average marketable debt from 1996 to 2004 is 56% of total external debt in Argentina, 59% in Brazil,
and 58% in Mexico (Cowan et al. 2006).
9where pt,i (c) is the coupon bond’s price, and rn
t,i is the zero-coupon yield curve. The time
until each future payment is weighted by the discounted value of that payment relative to
the price of the bond. A zero-coupon bond has duration equal to the number of years until
its maturity date, but a coupon-paying bond has duration shorter than its time to maturity.
We consider duration as a measure of maturity because it is more comparable across bonds
with diﬀerent coupon rates.
We calculate the average maturity and average duration of new bonds issued in each
week by each country. Table 1 displays each country’s averages of these weekly maturity
and duration series within periods of high (above median) and low (below median) 2-year
spreads.
Table 1: Average Maturity and Duration of New Debt
Maturity (years) Duration (years)
2-year spread: < median ≥ median < median ≥ median
Argentina 10.25 7.79 5.93 4.82
Brazil 13.66 7.06 6.37 4.73
Mexico 13.24 10.32 7.66 6.49
Russia 8.41 11.78 5.93 5.38
First, the table shows that duration tends to be much shorter than maturity. Because the
yield on an emerging market bond is typically high, the principal payment at the maturity
date is severely discounted, and much of the bond’s value comes from coupon payments made
before maturity.
Second, the average duration of debt is shorter when spreads are high than when they are
low. Mexico, for example, issues debt that averages about 1.2 years longer in duration when
the 2-year spread is below its median than when it is above its median. For all countries
except Russia, this pattern also holds for the average time-to-maturity of bonds issued during
periods of high spreads compared to low spreads: Mexico issues bonds that mature about 3
years sooner when spreads are high.
In Table 2, we report the results of several univariate panel regressions of duration on
spread measures. We pool the data for the four countries and include country ﬁxed eﬀects.
All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Column I reports the eﬀect of the 2-year spread on the duration of new issuances.
The coeﬃcient means that a one percentage point increase in the 2-year spread is associated
10with a decrease in the duration of new debt issued by just under half a year. Column 2 shows
a similar eﬀect for the 10-year spread. These ﬁgures indicate that the covariation between
the duration of new debt issuance and interest rate spreads is both economically large and
statistically signiﬁcant.10
Table 2: Regressions of Duration of New Issuances on Spreads











R2 0.201 0.195 0.157
No. of obs. 151 151 151
Note: All speciﬁcations include a constant. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses, and ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
I nT a b l e3 ,w ee m p h a s i z et h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h es p r e a dc u r v eslopes and average
duration. The slope of the spread curve, deﬁned here as the diﬀerence between the 10-year
(long-term) and 2-year (short-term) spread, falls when the 2-year spread is high — the numbers
in column 4 of Table 3 are smaller than those in column 3. During these times, however,
the countries shift toward short-term debt, even though the spreads on long-term debt rise
less than for short-term debt. In Brazil, for example, while the spread curve changes from
depicting a 10-year spread that is about 3 percentage points above the 2-year spread to one
that is 1.41 percentage points below the 2-year spread, the average duration of newly issued
debt reduces by more than 2 years.
Column III of Table 2 shows that the duration of new debt is positively associated with
how large the 10-year spread is relative to the 2-year spread. When the ratio of the long
spread to the short spread increases by one, the duration of new debt rises by about half a
year.
10These estimates mirror the ﬁndings in Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008). They show that a
high spread level is a statistically signiﬁcant determinant for a shorter maturity of debt issuances even after
controlling for selection eﬀects due the fact that the timing of debt issuances is very irregular. Their empirical
work treats the issuance of short-term or long-term debt as a discrete variable, whereas we use the continuous
variable of duration as a measurement of maturity.
11Table 3: Slope of Spread Curve and Average Duration of Issuances
Duration (years) Spread curve slope (%)
s10 − s2
short spread: < 25th pct ≥ 75th pct < 25th pct ≥ 75th pct
Argentina 6.33 5.02 2.16 -1.02
Brazil 6.94 4.63 3.09 -1.41
Mexico 8.79 6.75 1.98 0.79
R u s s i a 6 . 4 66 . 1 20 . 7 80 . 2 2
2.3 Summary
The message of this section is that the spread curve and the maturity of bond issuances in
emerging markets are time-varying. In particular, the level of spreads covaries negatively
with the duration of new debt, and with the slope of the spread curve: when spreads are low,
the slope of the spread curve is higher, and the maturity of new debt is longer, than when
short-term spreads are high.
Standard asset pricing arguments would equate the price of a sovereign bond to the present
discounted value of payments the bondholder expects to receive, adjusted for risk. Variation
in interest rate spreads in this context, across maturity and over time, can come from a
variety of sources, in particular, changes in the expected probability of default; changes in
the amount lenders can recover in case of default; and variation in the lenders’ compensation
for risk, or risk premium. To understand the determinants of the maturity composition of
debt, it is important to disentangle these three factors, since they may have diﬀerent eﬀects
on the incentives to accumulate short- and long-term debt. Since we do not observe the time
paths of the probability of default, the expected recovery rate, or the risk premium in the
data, in the following sections we build a model in which the maturity structure of debt is
endogenous, and these three factors play a role in pricing it.11 When we calibrate this model
t od a t af o ra ne m e r g i n gm a r k e te c o n o m y ,w ec a nq u a n t i f yt h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h e s ef a c t o r si n
explaining the relationship between spreads and debt maturity observed in the data.
11An alternative approach to bond pricing with default is that of Duﬃe and Singleton (1999), used for
s o v e r e i g nd e b ti nD u ﬃe, Pedersen and Singleton (2003) and Pan and Singleton (2008). These papers back
out risk- and recovery-adjusted probabilities of default from bond price data, but they need to specify an
exogenous stochastic process for default events, and they do not consider the issuance of debt by the borrower.
123 The Model
We consider a dynamic model of defaultable debt that includes bonds of short and long
duration. A small open economy receives a stochastic stream of income, y that follows a
Markov process with compact support and transition function f(yt,y t+1). The economy
trades two bonds of diﬀerent duration with international lenders. Financial contracts are
unenforceable, so the economy can default on its debt at any time. If the economy defaults,
it temporarily loses access to international ﬁnancial markets and also incurs direct costs.
The representative agent in the small open economy (henceforth, the “borrower”) receives






where 0 <β<1 is the time discount factor and u(·) is increasing and concave.
The borrower issues debt in the form of two types of perpetuity contracts with coupon
payments that decay geometrically. We let {δS,δL} ∈ [0,1] denote the “decay factors” of the
payments for the two bonds. A perpetuity with decay factor δm is a contract that speciﬁes
ap r i c eqm
t and a loan face value  m
t such that the borrower receives qm
t  m
t u n i t so fg o o d si n
period t and promises to pay, conditional on not defaulting, δ
n−1
m  m
t u n i t so fg o o d si ne v e r y
future period t + n. The decay of each perpetuity is related to its duration: a bond of
this type with rapidly declining payments has a larger proportion of its value paid early on,
and therefore a shorter duration, than a bond with more slowly declining payments. We let
δS <δ L,s ot h a tδS is the decay of the perpetuity with short duration and δL is the decay of
the perpetuity with long duration. We will refer to the perpetuities with decay factors δS and
δL throughout as short and long bonds, respectively. Each one of our bonds resembles the
long-duration bond in Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2008).
By having two such assets, we allow the borrower to choose the maturity composition of debt
each period.
At every date t the economy has outstanding all past bond issuances. Deﬁne bm
t ,t h e
stock of bonds of duration m at time t, as the total payments due in period t on all past
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0 is given. Thus, the accumulation for the stocks of short and long perpetuities can
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With these deﬁnitions, we can compactly write the borrower’s budget constraint condi-
tional on not defaulting. Purchases of consumption are constrained by the endowment less
payments on outstanding debt, bS
t +bL
t , plus the issues of new short bonds  S
t at price qS
t and
long bonds  L
t at a price qL
t :













The borrower chooses new issues of perpetuities from a menu of contracts where prices qS
t
and qL
t for are quoted for each pair (bS
t+1,b L
t+1).
If the borrower defaults, we assume that all outstanding debts and assets (bS
t + bL
t ) are
erased from the budget constraint, and the economy cannot borrow or save, so that con-





yt if yt ≤ (1 − λ)¯ y
(1 − λ)¯ y if yt > (1 − λ)¯ y
,
where ¯ y is the mean level of output. This speciﬁcation, following Arellano (2008), assumes
that borrowers lose a fraction λ of output if output is above a threshold.
3.1 Recursive Problem
We represent the borrower’s inﬁnite horizon decision problem as a recursive dynamic pro-
gramming problem. The model has two endogenous states — the stocks of each type of debt,
bS
t and bL
t — and one exogenous state, the income of the economy, yt. The state of the economy
at date t is then given by (bS,b L,y) ≡ (bS
t ,b L
t ,y t).
At any given state, the value of the option to default is given by
v








where vc(bS,b L,y) is the value associated with not defaulting and staying in the contract and
vd(y) is the value associated with default.
Since we assume that default costs are incurred whenever the borrower fails to repay its
14obligations in full, the model will generate default on all outstanding debt, both short and
long term. When the borrower defaults, output falls to ydef, and the economy is temporarily
in ﬁnancial autarky; θ is the probability that it will regain access to international credit















We are taking a simple route to model both costs of default that seem empirically relevant:
exclusion from ﬁnancial markets and direct costs in output. Moreover, we assume that the
default value does not depend on the maturity composition of debt prior to default. This
captures the idea that the maturity composition of defaulted debt is not relevant for the
restructuring procedures that allow the economy to reenter the credit market.12
When the borrower chooses to remain in the contract, the value is the following:
v



















subject to the budget constraint:








L,y) L = y − bS − bL (9)
and to the laws of motion for the stock of perpetuities of short and long duration:
b
0
S = δSbS +  S
b
0
L = δLbL +  L.
The borrower decides on optimal debt levels b0
S and b0
L to maximize utility. The borrower
takes as given that each contract {b0
S,b 0
L} comes with speciﬁc prices {qS,qL} that are contin-
gent on today’s state y. The decision of whether to remain in the credit contract or default
is a period-by-period decision, so that the expected value from next period forward in (8)
incorporates the option to default in the future.
The default policy can be characterized by default sets and repayment sets. Let the
repayment set, R(bS,b L), be the set of output levels for which repayment is optimal when
12This is consistent with empirical evidence regarding actual restructuring processes, where the maturity
composition of the new debt obligations is part of the restructuring agreement (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
2005).
15short- and long-term debt are (bS,b L):
R(bS,b L)=
©
y ∈ Y : v
c(bS,b L,y) ≥ v
d(y)
ª
,( 1 0 )
and let the complement, the default set D(bS,b L), be the set of output levels for which default
is optimal for debt positions (bS,b L):
D(bS,b L)=
©





When the borrower does not default, optimal new debt takes the form of two decision
rules mapping today’s state into tomorrow’s debt levels:
b
0
S = ˜ bS(bS,b L,y) (12)
b
0
L = ˜ bL(bS,b L,y)
Given this characterization of debt and default decisions, we can now deﬁne the equilib-
rium bond prices at which lenders are willing to oﬀer contracts.
3.2 Bond Prices, Spreads, and Duration
Lenders are perfectly competitive, and value payoﬀs across states and time according to a
pricing kernel, or stochastic discount factor, M (yt,y t+1), which we specify further below.
L e n d e r sa r ew i l l i n gt op u r c h a s ead e f a u l t a b l eb o n da tap r i c ee q u a lt ot h er i s k - a d j u s t e d
expected discounted value of payments received from the bond.13
Each new issue of debt  S
t > 0 or  L
t > 0 b yt h eb o r r o w e ri sap r o m i s et op a yac o u p o n
payment every period in the future, conditional on not defaulting up to that period. If  S
t or
 L
t is negative, then the borrower is repurchasing some of its debt. If the borrower defaults






. The price of a new debt
issue, then, is the discounted sum of the value of the promised coupon payments, adjusted
by the cumulative probability of repayment, plus the value of recovery in case of default. If






, the prices qm
t for loans  m
t of duration m = S,L are given
13Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) show that risk premia are crucial for understanding government bond
prices. Risk premia allow us to match bond prices and spreads better, and we consider their eﬀects on the
maturity structure of debt in the numerical results. We discuss in detail in Section 5 why we specify the
































˜ f (yt+n−1,y t+n)dyt+n (14)













for repayment and default sets. The term Φm
t+n is the risk-adjusted expected
payoﬀ of type m bonds in period t+n, conditional on the borrower having repaid up to period
t + n − 1. It is given by a weighted sum of the coupon payment, δ
n−1
m , in those states in






, in those states in which
the borrower defaults.
Note that the price qm
t of new debt issuances depends on current income, yt,a si ti n ﬂuences
expectations of future output realizations which determine future default decisions. The






n=1,s i n c et h e
outstanding debt in any period determines the decision to default, given the income level.
However, we can transform the inﬁnite sum in (13) into a recursive expression for qm
t by
assuming that the lender forecasts the future debt levels using the borrower’s own decision





















































































14 ˜ f is just a normalization of the “risk-neutral” probability density, 1









































A recursive equilibrium for this economy is (i) a set of policy functions for consumption
˜ c(bS,b L,y), new issuances for short-term debt ˜  S(bS,b L,y) and long-term debt ˜  L(bS,b L,y),
perpetuity stocks for short-term debt ˜ bS(bS,b L,y) and long-term debt ˜ bL(bS,b L,y), repayment
sets R(bS,b L), and default sets D(bS,b L), and (ii) price functions for short debt qS (b0
S,b 0
L,y)
and long debt qL(b0
S,b 0
L,y), such that:





functions˜ bS(bS,b L,y),˜ bL(bS,b L,y), ˜  S(bS,b L,y), ˜  L(bS,b L,y) and ˜ c(bS,b L,y), repayment
sets R(bS,b L), and default sets D(bS,b L) satisfy the borrower’s optimization problem.
2. The bond price functions qS (b0
S,b 0
L,y) and qL (b0
S,b 0
L,y) satisfy equations (15) and (16).
We consider risk premia and recovery in bond prices through the functions M and ϕ
because these features are important for quantitatively matching the behavior of spreads
in the data. However, we take a reduced-form approach to these features, because our
f o c u si so nh o wt h eb o r r o w e rc h o o s e st h em a t u r ity structure of debt, given the equilibrium
price schedules qS and qL. From this perspective, risk compensation and recovery aﬀect
the borrowing decision only through their eﬀects on the price schedules, so a more detailed
model of international lenders should have the same eﬀect as a suﬃciently ﬂexible reduced-
form description of their behavior.
To compare the model’s predictions to the data, we deﬁne the yield on each bond as in
the data, as the implicit constant interest rate at which the discounted value of the bond’s























We deﬁne the spread as the diﬀerence between the yield on a defaultable bond and the
default-free rate:
sS = rS − r
∗
S and sL = rL − r
∗
L.
18The default-free rates r∗
m are the analogues of (17) deﬁned from the prices of default-free
bonds.
As output and debt change, the probability of default varies over time, and therefore
the prices of long-term and short-term debt diﬀer, since they each put diﬀerent weights on
repayment probabilities in the future, as seen in (13). Spreads on short-term and long-term
bonds therefore generally diﬀer, and the relationship between the two spreads changes over
time, so that the spread curve is time-varying.
Finally, we deﬁne the duration of debt issued at each date as the weighted average of the
time until each coupon payment, with the weights determined by the fraction of the bond’s













1 − δSe−rS and dL =
1
1 − δLe−rL. (18)
4 Default and Optimal Maturity
In this section we illustrate the mechanisms that determine the maturity composition of debt
in a simpliﬁed, three-period version of our model, in which the borrower receives income
over time, but prefers to consume sooner rather than later. In this environment, debt allows
the borrower to transfer income between states of the world, particularly from future states
to the present, and the price of debt is determined by the borrower’s willingness to repay.
We show that short-term debt is more eﬀective than long-term debt at transferring income
f r o mt h en e a rf u t u r et ot h ep r e s e n t .H o w e v e r ,l o n g - t e r md e b ta l l o w st h eb o r r o w e rt oa v o i d
rolling over large short-term loans at unfavorable prices, which allows resources to be more
eﬃciently transferred from high-income to low-income states. We use this example to derive
statistics that are useful in measuring the relative beneﬁts of short-term and long-term debt
in our quantitative results in the next section.
The three periods are labelled t =0 ,1,2. The borrower’s preferences are linear over
consumption in each period, given by
U = E[c0 + βc1 + β
2c2] ,
with β<1, so that the borrower prefers to front-load consumption. In period 0,t h eb o r -
rower’s income equals zero, and in periods 1 and 2 income y1 and y2 c a nt a k eo no n eo ft w o
19values, yH or yL with yH >y L, according to the following process:
Pr(y1 = yH)=α
Pr(y2 = yH|y1 = yH)=pH
Pr(y2 = yH|y1 = yL)=pL
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Figure 3: Structure of the Example
The income process and the borrower’s consumption and borrowing possibilities are de-
picted in Figure 3. The borrower can issue one- and two-period zero coupon bonds b1
0 and b2
0
























In period 1, conditional on not defaulting, the borrower can issue new one-period bonds
bi
1 given the price schedule qi
1(bi
1),w h e r ei = L,H indexes the state, which corresponds to the
realization of income y1. Consumption is equal to income plus new debt, minus repayment:
c
i









In period 2, conditional on not defaulting, the borrower pays oﬀ long-term debt issued in















2 refers to consumption in the state with income history y1 = yi,y 2 = yj,f o ri,j =
L,H. We refer to states L and H in period 1 and states LL, LH, HL,a n dHH in period 2.
If the borrower defaults at any time, all outstanding debt is erased and consumption from
then on is equal to ydef =0 . We assume that if the borrower is indiﬀerent between defaulting
and repaying, then he repays. Lenders are risk-neutral and do not discount the future, and
they do not recover anything in case of default, i.e. the pricing kernel M =1and the recovery
rate ϕ =0 , so the price of a loan is equal to the probability or repayment.
We assume throughout this section that parameters satisfy:
pHyH − yL




pH (yH − yL)
¶1/2
(19)
This restriction ensures that the borrower is suﬃciently impatient so as to borrow enough
that default happens with positive probability, but also patient enough so as to value the
future resources lost from defaulting. Under this assumption, the optimal, time-consistent
policy for the borrower is to default in period 2, only after two low shocks, i.e. in state LL,




0 =1 , q
2
0 = α +( 1− α)pL (20)
q
H
1 =1 , q
L
1 = pL
In period 0, the borrower uses long-term debt to transfer income yL to period 0, b2
0 = yL.
This is because any two-period loan above yL will not be repaid in state HL, violating the
default policy. This leaves the borrower in period 1 with the ability to borrow additional
income, up to what is consistent with the default policy, from period 2, bH
1 = yL − b2
0 =0
and bL
1 = yH − b2
0 = yH − yL. This implies that in period 0, the borrower is able to issue
one-period bonds b1
0 = yL + pL (yH − yL). The consumption allocation this implies is then
c0 = yL + pL(yH − yL)+( α +( 1− α)pL)yL (21)
c
H










2 =0 , c
LL
2 = ydef =0
21To evaluate the role each maturity of debt plays in getting to this consumption allocation,
we consider what happens if either short-term or long-term debt is reduced.
Short-term debt induces repayment in the near future To illustrate the beneﬁt
of short-term debt, we consider what would happen if the borrower substituted long-term
debt for short-term debt in period 0. Increasing long-term debt b2
0 by any amount above yL
requires either defaulting in state HL as well as LL, or requires saving in period 1 to repay
the higher debt in period 2. However, saving is not optimal from the perspective of period
1, so the borrower cannot commit to saving. In equilibrium, debt issued in either state in
period 1 is nonnegative. The higher default probability lowers the price lenders are willing
to pay for long-term bonds to q2
0 = αpH +( 1− α)pL from the value in (20), α +( 1− α)pL.
Furthermore, increasing b2
0 above yH is infeasible, since then q2
0 w o u l dd r o pt oz e r o ,b e c a u s e
of the inability to commit to saving in period 1. This means that the borrower is unable
to transfer income from either state in period 1 to period 0, because long-term borrowing is
limited by period-2 income.
In contrast, with short-term debt, the borrower is required to repay the income y1 in
the ﬁrst period before borrowing against period 2 income. Since the borrower would value
the resources lost from defaulting in period 1, short-term debt is a way to use the threat of
punishment to enforce repayment in the short-term.
Long-term debt provides hedging Now we consider what would happen if the borrower
tried to substitute short-term debt for long-term debt in the original allocation. This is
infeasible because the borrower is unable to rollover any more short-term debt in period 1
state L. Under the optimal allocation derived above, consumption at all the nodes from
period 1 state L onward — cL
1, cLH
2 ,a n dcLL
2 in (21) — are zero, so any additional debt due in
period 1 state L cannot be repaid.
Long-term debt helps the borrower in this situation because it provides a hedge against
the uncertainty in period 1. To see how this works, consider the resources available for
consumption in period 1. Given that bH
1 = yL − b2
0 and bL
1 = yH −b2
0, consumption in period
1i sg i v e nb y :
c
H



















0 in favor of increasing b2
0 reduces the present value of the borrower’s debt
obligations — how much debt needs to be rolled over — in the low-income state, but leaves
22it unchanged in the high-income state. In this sense, issuing long-term debt is a hedge. In
eﬀect, issuing long-term debt transfers resources from state H to state L, since increasing b2
0
lowers cH
1 at a one-to-one rate, while it lowers cL
1 at the rate pL < 1. This raises the value of
resources at the rate (1 − pL). Since the borrower prefers to consume early, this transfer of
income out of state H in period 1 changes consumption relative to the allocation with only
one-period bonds by raising consumption in period 0 (by the present value α(1 − pL)yL).
Equilibrium consumption and default with only one maturity of debt The previ-
ous two subsections illustrated that short-term and long-term debt provide distinct beneﬁts,
in the sense that the borrower cannot costlessly substitute one for the other. For complete-
ness, we provide here the optimal allocations with only one maturity of debt. With only
long-term debt, the borrower defaults in the additional state (HL)i np e r i o d2 .W i t ho n l y
short-term debt, though, the borrower does not actually borrow enough to face a roll-over
crisis and default in period 1 state L; borrowing is simply constrained in period 0.
The allocations with only one maturity of debt are as follows:
Only long-term debt Only short-term debt
b2
0 = yH b1
0 = yL + pLyH
bL
1 =0 , bH
1 =0 bL
1 = yH, bH
1 = yL
c0 =( αpH +( 1− α)pL)yH c0 = yL + pLyH
cH
1 = yH, cL
1 = yL cH
1 =( 1− pL)yH, cL
1 =0
cHH
2 =0 , cHL
2 = ydef =0 cHH
2 = yH − yL, cHL
2 =0
cLH
2 =0 , cLL
2 = ydef =0 cLH
2 =0 , cLL
2 = ydef =0
It is straightforward to show that the borrower attains strictly lower utility under either of
these allocations than under the consumption allocation in (21) with both short-term and
long-term debt.
Summary
In a standard incomplete markets model with ﬂuctuating output and without default, a
borrower would ﬁnd the portfolio of long and short debt indeterminate if the risk-free rate
were constant across time; the two assets would have payoﬀst h a tm a k et h e me q u i v a l e n t .
However, in our model, the risk of default makes the two assets distinct, resulting in a tradeoﬀ
between issuing short-term and long-term debt. This tradeoﬀ in our example is similar to
that analyzed in Hart and Moore (1989, 1994), in a contracting problem between an investor
and an entrepreneur who controls a productive project. Hart and Moore argue that the
23tension between short-term and long-term debt is between defaulting early or defaulting
later, but with larger losses. In our example, this tension limits the capacities of short-term
and long-term borrowing diﬀerently.
The capacity for borrowing using long-term debt is limited by the inability to commit to
saving income in the near future to repay farther in the future. Hence short-term debt is
a better instrument for borrowing against resources in the near future, because large short-
term loans are available at higher prices than long-term loans. We refer to this beneﬁt
as a liquidity advantage of short-term debt. However, the borrowing capacity of short-
term debt is limited by the risk of not being able to roll over large amounts of short-term
debt in low-income states. Long-term debt alleviates this problem by enabling a transfer
of resources from high-income states to low-income states. We call this attribute a hedging
beneﬁt of long-term debt, because the outstanding value of long-term debt falls in states
of the world in which resources are scarce. In our examples above, this hedging translated
into higher current consumption, because we assumed the borrower did not value smoothing
consumption across states; however, if the borrower were risk averse, long-term debt would
enable smoothing consumption across states through this hedging beneﬁt. This hedging
mechanism is essentially the same as the role of long-lived securities in allocating risk across
periods in Kreps (1982). Angeletos (2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004), and Lustig, Sleet, and
Yeltekin (2008) emphasize this mechanism in models of the optimal maturity structure of
government debt with incomplete markets. The diﬀerence in our model is that bond prices
vary across states — and hence provide hedging — due to the government’s inability to commit
to repaying, even in the absence of variation in the lender’s marginal rate of substitution.
These liquidity and hedging properties shape the optimal maturity structure of debt
when the borrower can default. The quantitative relevance of each of these forces depends
on the speciﬁcs of preferences and the income process. Thus, in the next section we quantify
these two eﬀects by calibrating our general model to an actual emerging market economy.
To measure the liquidity and hedging mechanisms in our quantitative results in the next
section, we use two simple measures that follow from the examples in this section. The
liquidity advantage of short-term debt is reﬂected in its higher price and the ability to increase
current consumption more than what is possible with long-term debt. The hedging advantage
of long-term debt can be captured in the higher volatility of the value of outstanding long-
term debt relative to short-term debt. The example above illustrates an extreme version of
this: the value of short-term debt does not vary at all. Since the value of long-term debt
varies more, it provides a better hedge than short-term debt.
245 Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Parameterization
We solve the model numerically to evaluate its quantitative predictions regarding the dynamic
behavior of the optimal maturity composition of debt and the spread curve in emerging
markets. We calibrate an annual model to the Brazilian economy.15
The utility function of the borrower is u(c)=
c1−σ
1 − σ
. The borrower’s risk aversion coeﬃ-
cient is set to 2, which is a common value used in real business cycle studies. The stochastic
process for output is a log-normal AR(1) process, log(yt+1)=ρlog(yt)+εt+1 with E[ε2]=η2.
We discretize the shocks into a six-state Markov chain using a quadrature-based procedure
(Tauchen and Hussey, 1991). We use annual series of GDP growth for 1960—2004 taken from
the World Development Indicators to calibrate the volatility of output. Due to the short
sample, rather than estimating the autocorrelation coeﬃcient we choose an autocorrelation
coeﬃcient for the output process of 0.9, which is in line with standard estimates for developed
countries. The decay parameters of the short and long bonds, δS and δL, are set such that
the default-free durations equal 2 and 10 years. We also choose the probability of reentering
ﬁnancial markets, θ, so that the average length of time in exclusion is 6 years, consistent
with data presented in Benjamin and Wright (2009) on the median length of sovereign debt
renegotiations.
The function ϕ(bS,b L) in the pricing expressions (15)-(16) is a reduced-form represen-
tation of the fraction of debt recovered after default. We set this function to ϕ(bS,b L)=
exp(−(q∗
SbS + q∗
LbL)),w i t hq∗
S and q∗
L equal to the default-free prices. This functional form
is a convenient way to capture two features of the recovery rate: it lies between zero and one,
and it declines with the quantity of debt issued. Intuitively, this is motivated by the idea
that there is a ﬁxed amount of surplus that lenders are able to extract from borrowers in the
event of a default, so this amount declines as a fraction of debt as debt grows. Yue (2006)
shows that, in a model in which the debt recovery rate is endogenously determined by a bar-
gaining process between lenders and a defaulting borrower, the recovery rate is decreasing
and convex in debt, much like the function ϕ.
The risk premium in our model comes from the interaction of the lenders’ pricing kernel
with default outcomes. We can rewrite equation (15) (and analogously, (16)) as a typical
15The algorithm used to solve the model extends that in Arellano (2009) to allow for two bonds. In
addition, we follow Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2009) in updating the value function and the bond
price functions concurrently.
25asset-pricing equation:










S in states in which the borrower repays
ϕ in states in which the borrower defaults
Written this way, the price of a bond is composed of the lender’s discounted expected
payoﬀ plus a risk premium term:







Payoﬀs vary across states due to default events as well as changes in the future probability
of default, reﬂected in q0
S. To the extent that this variation is negatively correlated with the
pricing kernel, investors are compensated for this risk through paying a lower price qS for
d e b t .W es p e c i f yt h ep r i c i n gk e r n e la sf o l l o w s :
M (yt,y t+1)=e x p
µ








where r and α are parameters, εt+1 =l o gyt+1−ρlogyt is the shock to the borrower’s income,
and η is its variance. The term r represents the risk-free interest rate; we set this at 4%
annually, which equals the average annual yield of a two year U.S. bond from 1996 to 2004.
The term α controls correlated the pricing kernel is with innovations εt+1 to the borrower’s
income level. (The term 1
2α2η2 is a normalization.)
This pricing kernel is a variation on the one-factor term structure models discussed in,
for example, Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (1998). We deﬁne the pricing kernel as a function
of only the borrower’s income because it is a parsimonious way to model risk premia that
vary with the probability of default. In our model, default decisions depend on the model’s
entire state, (y,bS,b L), but our shortcut is valid for two reasons: ﬁrst, default probabilities
in the model are highly correlated with income. Second, in the absence of default, our model
with this pricing kernel would generate a default-free interest rate that is constant and a ﬂat
default-free term structure. This is because, from equations (15) or (16), the price q∗
m of a














so the yield, deﬁned as in equation (17), is constant and independent of the bond’s duration:17
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Even though α is a constant, the size of the risk premium varies over time because the
default probability, which depends on y, bS,a n dbL, varies over time. The borrower’s income
is a convenient state variable, because the borrower tends to default when income is low.
Since income is persistent, low current income signals high default probabilities, and hence
low prices, in the future. Therefore, since payoﬀs xm are positively correlated with the
borrower’s income, the pricing kernel M in equation (22) generates a positive risk premium
if α>0.
We calibrate the parameter α as well as the output cost after default, λ, and the borrower’s
time preference parameter β, to match the following moments of Brazilian data: the average
2- and 10-year spreads and the volatility of the trade balance relative output.
Table 4 summarizes the parameter values, and Table 5 presents the calibrated moments
as well as other statistics from the model. The model matches the calibrated moments well,
although it underestimates a bit the mean 10-year spread. The model predicts that con-
sumption is about as variable as output, and that consumption is negatively correlated with
spreads and the fraction of debt that is short term: in bad times, consumption is low, spreads
are relatively high, and debt is mostly short. The high volatility of consumption relative to
output and the countercyclicality of spreads are well documented features of emerging mar-
kets. The model predicts that the average recovery in default is 44%,a sc o m p a r e dt ot h e
16Using the fact that M is lognormal,







=e x p ( −r)
17In practice, since we discretize the state space of our model, we also have to normalize the pricing kernel
so that default-free yields are constant in the discretized environment.
27average recovery rate of 60% reported in sovereign defaults reported by Benjamin and Wright
(2009).
Table 4: Parameters Values
Value Target
Lenders’ discount rate r =4 % U.S. annual interest rate 4%
Borrower’s risk aversion σ =2 Standard value
Perpetuity decay factors δS =0 .52 Default-free durations of 2 and 10 years
δL =0 .936
Stochastic structure ρ =0 .9,η=0 .017 Brazil output











Brazil average 2-year spread
Brazil average 10-year spread
volatility of trade balance
Table 5: Model Statistics
Model Data
Targeted Moments
mean sS (percent) 5.5 5.6
mean sL (percent) 6.4 7.1
std(trade balance)/std(y)0 . 3 6 0 . 3 6
Other Moments
mean recovery rate 0.44 0.60
std(c)/std(y)1 . 0 1 1 . 1 0
corr(c,2-year spread) -0.42
corr(c,10-year spread) -0.34
corr(c, qS S/(qS S + qL L)) -0.77
5.2 Results
We simulate the model, and in the following subsections we report statistics on the dynamic
behavior of spreads and the maturity composition of debt from the limiting distribution of
debt holdings. We ﬁrst show that the model matches the data in generating time-varying
diﬀerences in the pricing of short- and long-term debt, due to movements in the probability of
default and risk premia. The behavior of prices generates time-varying liquidity and hedging
beneﬁts of the two assets, which rationalizes the maturity composition observed in the data.
28Prices and Spreads
Default in our model happens when the economy has a low level of wealth, either due to
low income or high debt. Since income and debt are persistent, states with low income and
high debt tend to have high spreads, as the future probabilities of default, and therefore risk
premia, are high.
We now compare spread dynamics in the model to the data. The series for the data are
Brazilian 2- and 10-year spreads and prices from Section 2. For this comparison, we organize
the data into quantiles based on the level of the short spread. Table 6 presents average spreads
for short and long debt as well as the risk premium component of the model’s spreads across
periods when short spreads are below their 25th and 50th percentiles and above their 50th
and 75th percentiles.
Table 6: Spread Curves
DATA MODEL
sS percentile sS sL sS sL rpS rpL
< 25 2.2 5.3 0.6 2.6 0.2 0.4
< 50 2.7 5.4 1.2 3.4 0.3 0.5
≥ 50 8.5 8.9 9.7 9.5 0.5 0.7
≥ 75 12.3 10.8 14.9 14.0 0.7 0.9
Mean 5.6 7.1 5.5 6.4 0.4 0.6
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 6 present the short and long spreads in the data, and the
last four columns present the model’s predictions. In the model, when default is unlikely,
both spreads are low, and the spread curve is upward-sloping: when the short spread is below
its 25th percentile, for example, the average short spread is 0.6%, and the average long spread
is 2.6%. In contrast, when the probability of default is higher, both spreads rise, and the
spread curve becomes downward-sloping: when the short spread is above the 75th percentile,
the average short spread is 14.9%, and the average long spread is 14.0%. Compared to the
data for Brazil, the model captures well the dynamics of spreads curves and in particular the
slope of the spread curve associated with periods of high and low spreads. When spreads
are below the 25th percentile, the slope is about 2 percentage points, compared to a slope
of 3 percentage points in Brazil. In periods with spreads above the 75th percentile, the
slope of the spread curve in the model inverts to −0.9 percentage points, compared to −1.5
percentage points in Brazil. The model also generate an average slope of the spread curve of
about 1 percentage point, compared to 1.5 percentage points in the Brazilian data.
29Our model provides a decomposition of interest rate spreads into two parts: the actuarially
fair compensation for expected losses from default, and the risk premium. The actuarially
fair price qAF
m of a bond of duration m is deﬁned by taking the bond pricing equations (15)-
(16) and substituting just the probability density, f, for the product of the pricing kernel













































Then, the actuarially fair yield is given by rAF





,a n dt h espread risk
premium is deﬁned as rpm = rm−rAF
m .T h eﬁf t ha n ds i x t hc o l u m n so fT a b l e6s h o wt h et e r m
structure of spread risk premia in the model. Risk premia are positive, because the borrower
tends to default in states with low income, and the lender’s pricing kernel M is negatively
correlated with income. Also, risk premia are generally small according to this measure,
averaging less than one percentage point. However, they make up a relatively large fraction
of the interest rate spreads in good times, when the spreads are low. For example, the risk
premium accounts for one third of the 2-year spread when 2-year spreads are below their
25th percentile, but only for ﬁve percent when 2-year spreads are above their 75th percentile.
In addition, the risk premium on long-term debt is always higher than on short-term debt,
reﬂecting the fact that the risk premium is cumulated over a longer horizon. In eﬀect, our
model says that risk premia do not need to increase a lot in bad times to account for the large
increases in spreads, because the expected probability of default rises so much. However, this
decomposition does not address the question of how the degree of required risk compensation
aﬀects debt and default choices, and in turn the equilibrium term structure of spreads. We
examine this question in more detail in subsection 5.3.
Much of the literature on empirical asset pricing focuses on returns as a measure of risk
premia. In the context of sovereign bonds, Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008) show
that excess returns — returns relative to default-free bonds — on long-term bonds rise more
than excess returns on short-term bonds during a crisis, i.e. when spreads rise. Computing
excess returns from our model’s simulated data generates this pattern as well. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd that the average excess returns, deﬁned as (1+δmq0
m)/qm−(1+r),e q u a l0.3% and 0.4%
for short and long-term bonds in periods when the short spread is below its median. These
returns increase to 7.9% and 10.4% respectively when the short spread is above its median.
In our model, however, average excess returns in a simulation also capture changes in default
30probabilities, not just risk premia. In fact, under actuarially fair pricing, the magnitude and
pattern of average excess returns are similar to those under pricing with risk premia. We
choose not to focus on average excess returns, because in our model they are not zero in the
absence of risk premia.
Underlying the time-varying spreads is the interaction of the dynamics of income and debt
with the price schedules for short and long debt. (Figure 4, in the Appendix, illustrates the
equilibrium price schedules for short debt qS(b0
S,b 0
L,y) and long debt qL(b0
S,b 0
L,y).) However,
the mapping from discount prices to spreads is not linear (eq. 1). Thus, it is informative
to analyze price ratios deﬁned as defaultable discount prices relative to default-free prices
for a bond with duration m: qm/q∗
m. The price ratio of each bond is the total discounted
repayment probability over the lifetime of the bond, adjusted for risk and recovery. Table
7 presents statistics for these price ratios in the model and the data. The table shows that
contrary to spreads, price ratios for short-term debt are always higher than for long-term
debt both in the model and in the data. Moreover, price ratios are disproportionately lower








< 25 0.96 0.60 0.99 0.79
< 50 0.95 0.59 0.98 0.75
≥ 50 0.85 0.43 0.85 0.57
≥ 75 0.79 0.35 0.79 0.48
Mean 0.90 0.51 0.91 0.66
The distinct dynamics of price ratios and spreads can be understood as follows. Price
ratios reﬂect cumulative repayment probabilities adjusted for risk and recovery, whereas
spreads reﬂect average default probabilities. Cumulative default risk for long-term debt is
always larger than for short-term debt both in the data and the model. However, annualized
(average) default risk can be lower on long-term debt during times when the annual default
probability in the short run is larger than the annual default probability in the long run.
Thus, contrary to common belief in sovereign debt markets, the interest rate spread is not a
comprehensive measure of the relative cost of borrowing across diﬀerent maturities of debt.
In particular, in times when the probability of default is high, short-term debt may appear
18These patterns hold for price ratios in the data for Argentina, Mexico, and Russia as well.
31to be more expensive than long-term debt, in the sense that it has a higher spread, although
long-term debt is worse in the sense that it has a lower price, relative to the risk-free price.
The connection between the dynamic behavior of prices and spreads in our model is borne
out in the data as well.
The preceding discussion also indicates that the important feature of our model for gener-
ating the observed dynamics of prices and the spread curve is that the probability of default
is mean-reverting: a period with high probability of default is followed by a period with lower
probability of default, and vice versa. The eﬀects of mean-reverting default probabilities on
the spread curve are the same as those highlighted by Merton (1974) in the case of credit
spreads for corporate debt. In our model the probability of default is endogenously mean-
reverting as a result of the dynamics of the output process and debt accumulation. When
output is high, it is also expected to be high in the near future, so the probability of default in
the next period is low. The economy borrows a large amount at low interest rate spreads, so
that in states where the economy is hit by a bad shock, default becomes more likely further in
the future. In contrast, when the likelihood of imminent default is high, the economy avoids
default in the next period only in states with high output. Conditional on not defaulting,
then, output is expected to remain high, and the probability of default further in the future
falls. The persistence and mean reversion of default and repayment probabilities driven by
the dynamics of debt and income therefore rationalize the dynamic behavior of the spread
curve observed in the data.
Maturity Composition
We now present the quantitative predictions for the maturity composition of debt. As dis-
cussed in Section 4, the beneﬁts of short and long-term debt shape the dynamic behavior
of the maturity composition. First, long-term bonds provide a hedge that prevents having
to roll-over large amounts of debt at low prices; we ﬁnd that this hedging motive is more
valuable in times of high wealth. Second, short-term bonds are better at solving the lack
of enforcement problem as they reduce the default likelihood and are less likely to require
savings in order to be repaid. These forces give short-term debt the liquidity advantage as
more resources can be transferred to the present; we ﬁnd that this liquidity motive is more
valuable in times of low wealth. Given the negative correlation between wealth and spreads,
the borrower in our model uses long-term debt more heavily in times when spreads are low
a n ds h i f t st o w a r ds h o r t e rt e r mdebt when spreads are high.
32Table 8: Average Duration of New Debt Issuances
MODEL DATA
sS pctile
< 50 4.27 6.37
≥ 50 1.86 4.73
Overall 3.06 5.95
To compare issuances of long and short debt between the model and data, we compute
conditional averages of the duration of new debt issuances, based on the level of the short
spread. Average duration in the model is the sum of the duration (equation 18) of each
new bond issuance weighted by its share in total new debt issued. Moreover, given that in
the data we only compute the duration of debt issuances, and not repurchases, we do the
same in the model. Table 8 reports the average duration of new debt issuances when spreads
are above their median relative to when spreads are below their median in the model and
in the Brazilian data. Debt duration in the model mirrors the dynamics of duration in the
bond data of Brazil. In the model, average duration when spreads are low equals 4.27 years,
whereas it shortens to 1.86 when spreads are high. In Brazil, the average duration of bonds
issued when spreads are low equals 6.37 years and shortens to 4.73 years when spreads are
high. Although the model dynamics of duration as a function of spreads mirror the data, the
model underpredicts the average duration of debt and overpredicts the volatility in duration.
Table 9 provides more details about the maturity composition and the forces underlying
its determination. The ﬁrst row of Table 9 shows the model’s portfolio — the fraction
qS S
qS S+qL L
of the value of new debt that is short term — conditional on diﬀerent levels of the short spread.
When spreads are low, the borrower issues on average 43% of debt in long-term bonds, and
57% in short-term bonds. When spreads are high, the maturity composition shifts to only
1% in long-term bonds, and 99% in short-term bonds. Moreover, the majority of the value of
debt issuance is in short-term debt. As discussed in Section 4, the optimal portfolio depends
on the valuations of the hedging beneﬁts of long-term debt relative to the liquidity and cost
advantage of short-term debt. In the lower section of Table 9, we reports several alternative
metrics to evaluate these beneﬁts. First, to measure the cost advantage of short-term debt,




S.T h i sr a t i oc o m p a r e s
the expected discounted repayment probabilities adjusted for risk and recovery on the two
types of debt. As the table shows, long-term debt is always more costly than short-term




S is always less than one —
which implies higher future default costs. In addition, short-term debt is disproportionately
cheaper in low wealth times, as the slope of price ratios is lower, 0.67 relative to 0.77. Thus,
33a larger share of short-term debt in low wealth times can be understood as a reaction to the
more expensive long-term debt.
Table 9: Model Maturity Composition
Short Spread
< 50 pctile ≥ 50 pctile overall mean
qS S / (qS S + qL L) 0.57 0.99 0.79
sS, percent 1.2 9.7 5.5





S) 0.77 0.67 0.72











































A more detailed measure of the liquidity beneﬁt of short-term debt is given by calculating
the increase in consumption that would be possible by marginally increasing short-term debt,
relative to the increase in consumption that is possible by issuing more long-term debt.
Speciﬁcally, deﬁne Ψ(b0
S,b 0






L − δLbL) as
the quantity of consumption that is attained with a certain debt policy b0
S,b 0
L,g i v e nt h e
state (bS,b L,y). We calculate the ratio of deviations from the equilibrium debt policy for





S + εS,b 0





L + εL,b S,b L,y) − Ψ(b0
S,b 0
L,b S,b L,y)
where εS and εL are small, and are chosen so that if bond prices were always equal to the
default-free prices, the ratio would be exactly equal to 1. This ratio in our model is on average
equal to 1.46. Thus, short-term debt is in equilibrium more liquid because consumption can
be marginally increased more with short-term debt than with long-term debt. The reason
is that price schedules for short-term debt are more lenient by having higher prices that
34decrease by less as debt increases. Looking across periods, this diﬀerence is especially large
in states in which spreads are high. Thus, short-term debt is particularly useful for increasing
consumption when spreads are high.
Considering the individual components of this ratio, ∆S and ∆L,a l s os h o w sw h ye x -
plaining the equilibrium maturity structure is more complicated than ranking short-term
and long-term debt according to a “pecking order” along the lines of Myers (1984). In the
context of our model, a pecking order would mean that the borrower issues one maturity of
debt until its borrowing capacity is exhausted — its ∆ is zero — and then issues the other
maturity if additional consumption is needed. However, ∆S, ∆L,  S,a n d L are typically
all positive, meaning that the borrower issues both maturities of debt when either one alone
would be able to raise consumption. The borrower does not typically borrow to the limit
using either maturity, indicating that the tradeoﬀ between short-term and long-term debt
leads to an interior choice for the maturity composition.
The hedging beneﬁts of debt can be measured by considering the variation in value of
outstanding debt and future prices. The value of outstanding one period discount bonds have
zero variation because in all states the value equals the face value of the bond. The value of
longer-term debt varies with the state because the price depends on the varying risk-adjusted
default risk. When the value of debt varies, it provides a hedge against ﬂuctuations in the
borrower’s consumption if the value and price of debt fall — meaning the present value of the
debt burden declines — when income is low. Hence, we measure the hedging beneﬁto fd e b t
in three ways: with the standard deviation of the price q0
m and value and of each type of
debt, (1 + δmq0
m)b0
m, (and their sum) and the correlation of debt values with the borrower’s
income y0.19
T h et a b l es h o w st h a to na v e r a g el o n g - t e r md e b ti sab e t t e rh e d g e .I t sp r i c ea n dv a l u ea r e
more volatile than for short-term debt. The standard deviation of the long-term price and
value equal 1.17 and 0.89 relative to 0.18 and 0.60 for short-term debt. Long-term debt is
also more positively correlated with income with a correlation of 0.7, whereas the correlation
is close to zero for short-term debt.
When spreads are high, the value of short-term debt appears more volatile and correlated
with income than the value of long-term debt. This is because the quantity of long-term debt
is very small relative to short-term debt — long-term debt averages only 1% of debt issuance
when spreads are high. If we look at the volatility of prices, not values, during diﬀerent
periods, the standard deviation of the price of long-term bonds is higher than the standard
19Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2008) also measure the hedging beneﬁts of debt with standard deviations
and correlations in their work on domestic debt.
35deviation of the price of short-term bonds, either within periods when spreads are high (1.21
vs. 0.21) or when spreads are low (0.79 vs. 0.09). This indicates that, even though long-term
debt is still a better hedge in periods with high spreads, the liquidity beneﬁto fs h o r t - t e r m
debt dominates the determination of the portfolio in these periods.
In summary, through the lens of our model, the maturity structure of defaultable debt
in emerging markets and its covariation with spread curves and levels can be rationalized by
two factors: a hedging advantage of long-term debt for insuring against ﬂuctuations in future
default risk, and a liquidity advantage of short-term debt for providing higher resources with
more lenient prices.
5.3 Counterfactuals
In this section we use our calibrated model to explore how international ﬁnancial market
conditions aﬀect the choice of debt maturity and default of sovereign governments. To this
end, we perform two counterfactual exercises. First, we explore the role of lenders’ risk
aversion. We ﬁnd that high risk aversion lowers default probabilities and decreases the
usefulness of debt, especially of long-term debt, which leads to shorter duration of debt.
Second, we eliminate recovery of debt in case of default. We ﬁnd that zero recovery also
lowers default probabilities and limits the usefulness of debt, but especially of short-term
debt.
Risk Premia
In subsection 5.2, we assessed the contribution of risk premia by pricing bonds with the
actuarially fair pricing kernel in our model, given the borrower’s behavior. However, in our
m o d e l ,i ft h eb o r r o w e rw e r et ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tad i ﬀerent degree of lenders’ risk aversion,
debt and default decisions would change. Table 10 shows summary statistics on spreads, the
maturity composition of debt, the volatility of the trade balance, and the average default
probability when we re-solve our model for the case with zero and higher risk premia (α =0
and α =1 0respectively) while keeping all other parameters as in the benchmark calibration.
Risk premia have large eﬀects on spreads. As seen in the previous section, for given
default probabilities risk premia increase spreads. This is the standard result in models of
defaultable bond pricing models as in Duﬃe and Singleton (1999). However in our model
with endogenous default, high risk premia can decrease the level of spreads. The reason is
that risk premia make debt schedules more restricted — that is, prices fall faster with the level
of debt — and the borrower issues less debt, at lower levels of spreads. High risk premia in
36Table 10: Risk Premia, Spreads and Debt Maturity
Zero risk premia High risk premia
α =0 α =1 0
sS pct sS sL duration sS sL duration
< 50 3.1 5.5 4.7 1.3 3.4 2.0
≥ 50 13.2 12.4 1.8 11.0 13.5 1.9
Mean 8.2 10.0 3.3 6.1 8.5 1.9
std(trade balance)/std(y) 0.49 0.13
Default probability 8.3 3.9
our model also increase the diﬀerence between the average spread and the default probability
as well as the diﬀerence between the long and short spread,
Since debt choices are endogenous in our model, risk premia also have important eﬀects
on the dynamics and maturity of debt. Higher risk premia shorten debt maturity, dampen
the maturity dynamics and decrease the usefulness of debt as shown by a lower volatility
of the trade balance. All debt is more expensive and used less because price schedules are
very steep. Moreover, risk premia disproportionately aﬀect the schedule of long-term debt
which induces the borrower to practically never issue long-term debt. In fact the long-term
spreads presented in the table are essentially shadow prices for an arbitrarily small quantity
of long-term debt.20
Recovery
Finally, we evaluate the impact of recovery rates on spreads and debt holdings. We resolve
the model under the assumption that lenders recover zero in case of default (ϕ(bS,b L)=0 )
while maintaining all other parameters as in the benchmark calibration. Table 11 contains
these results.
Table 11: Recovery, Spreads and Debt Maturity
Benchmark Zero Recovery
sS pct sS sL duration sS sL duration
< 50 1.2 3.4 4.2 1.4 3.4 4.5
≥ 50 9.7 9.5 1.9 8.0 6.7 3.6
Mean 5.5 6.4 3.1 4.7 5.1 4.0
std(trade balance)/std(y) 0.35 0.29
Default probability 5.5 3.8
20Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008) also ﬁnd that higher risk premia shorten the maturity of debt
when changes in risk premia are due to exogenous shocks to lenders’ risk aversion.
37Recovery has important eﬀects on spreads, borrowing and default. The standard result in
models of defaultable bond pricing models is that reducing recovery rates increases spreads
b e c a u s ed e b ti sd i s c o u n t e dm o r eh e a v i l ya st h el o s si nc a s eo fd e f a u l ti sl a r g e rf o rl e n d e r s .
H o w e v e r ,i no u rm o d e lm a k i n gb o r r o w i n ge x - a n t em o r ee x p e n s i v em e a n st h a td e b ts c h e d u l e s
for short and long-term debt become more restricted which in equilibrium lowers default
because the borrower issues less debt. Hence, as in the case of high risk premia, lower
recovery rates makes spreads smaller and induces less usage of debt.
Table 11 shows that relative to the benchmark case (which produced an average recovery
rate of 44%) having zero recovery reduces default probabilities from 5.5% to 3.8% and reduces
average spreads by about 1%. In addition, zero recovery lowers the volatility of the trade
balance which implies less use of debt. Lower recovery also lengthens the debt maturity by
about a year and dampens the maturity dynamics. The reason why the model produces
a higher mean duration when recovery is zero is that an equal recovery rate for short and
long-term debt (as in the benchmark) is disproportionately beneﬁcial for short-term debt
prices, which are on average lower than the long term price. Hence, reducing recovery rates
disproportionately restricts the short-term debt schedule and induces a shift in the portfolio
towards long term debt. The maturity dynamics are dampened because the steep schedules
restrict the liquidity and hedging beneﬁts of short and long-term debt.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have developed a dynamic model to study the maturity composition of
sovereign bonds. In emerging markets data, changes in the maturity composition of debt
comove with changes in the term structure of spreads: when spreads on short-term debt are
low, long-term spreads are higher than short-term spreads, and the maturity of debt issued
is long. When short-term spreads rise, long-term spreads rise less, and the maturity of debt
shortens. Our model simultaneously reproduces the patterns observed in the term structure
of spreads and bond prices, and the maturity composition of debt. Changes in the spread
curve, which reﬂects the average default probability and risk premia at diﬀe r e n tt i m eh o r i z o n s ,
result from the output dynamics and the endogenous dynamics of debt. Issuing long-term
debt hedges future ﬂuctuations in consumption that come from changes in debt prices. Short-
t e r md e b tp r o v i d e sm o r el i q u i d i t yb e c a u s ei ta l l o w st h eb o r r o w e rt oa v o i dt h em o r es e v e r e
commitment problem in repaying long-term debt. With these two forces, the model generates
the pattern of issuances observed in the data. Long-term debt is issued mostly in times of
high wealth and low spreads, when the hedging motive is the strongest. Short-term debt is
38used more heavily in times when wealth is low and spreads are high, because expectations
of the borrower’s future debt and default choices restrict the availability of long-term debt
more heavily than of short-term debt.
Our main innovation has been to introduce multiple, long-term assets into a quantitative,
dynamic model with endogenous default. We view the resulting framework as useful for
addressing a variety of other questions for which it is important to analyze a trade-oﬀ in
maturity choice with defaultable debt. Natural applications are the maturity structure of
consumer and corporate debt. The literature on consumer bankruptcy thus far has focused on
modeling very short-term unsecured credit (Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2007)). However, it would be interesting to analyze both long-term and short-
term defaultable loans, such as mortgages and credit card debts. In addition, the mechanisms
in our model are likely to be relevant in corporate debt given the similarity between our facts
on emerging market spread curves and the cross section of corporate debt spread curves.
Default risk has been shown to have important implications for ﬁrm dynamics (Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) and Arellano, Bai, and Zhang (2007)). The model of this paper can be used
to further understand how the maturity choice can inﬂuence the entry, exit, and growth of
ﬁrms. Overall, our paper provides a tractable quantitative framework to study defaultable
debt of multiple maturities appropriate for these questions, and has highlighted the relevant
economic trade-oﬀs important for understanding debt maturity choice in the presence of
default.
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43Appendix
Data Description
All the sovereign bond data are from Bloomberg. For the four countries we examine, we use
all bonds with prices quoted at some point between March 1996 and May 2004, with the
following exceptions. We exclude all bonds with ﬂoating-rate coupon payments, and at every
date, we exclude bonds that are less than three months to maturity, following Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Wright (2007). For each country, we estimate spreads starting from the ﬁrst week
for which at least four bond prices are available every week through the end of the sample.
We use data from 110 bonds for Argentina, 71 for Brazil, 63 for Mexico, and 25 for Russia.
To estimate default-free yield curves, we use data on U.S. and European government bond
yields. The U.S. data are from the Federal Reserve Board, and the European data are
from the European Central Bank.21 For constructing the quarterly maturity and duration
statistics, we also include bonds issued during the sample period that did not have prices
quoted, and use the estimated spread curve to construct their prices according to equation
(24).
Spread Curve Estimation
We use a method proposed by Svensson (1994), and used recently by Gurkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2007) for the United States, and Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008) for a
sample of emerging markets, to ﬁt a spread curve to this data using a simple functional form
suggested by Nelson and Siegel (1987).
A coupon bond is priced as a collection of zero-coupon bonds, each with maturity given
by a coupon payment date, and face value given by the cash ﬂow on that payment date.
The price at date t of a bond issued by country i, paying an annual coupon rate c at dates
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with the face value of the bond paid on the last coupon date.




t (n) is a default-free yield curve.
21The U.S. data are the Treasury constant maturities yields, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
The European data are Euro area benchmark government bond yields, which is an average of European
national government bond yields available at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu.













































































for US ($)a n dE u r o( €) bonds.
As described by Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Diebold and Li (2006), the three components
of this curve correspond to a “long-term,” or “level” factor (the constant), a “short-term,”
or “slope” factor (the term multiplying β2) and a “medium-term,” or “curvature” factor (the
term multiplying β3). Linear combinations of these factors can capture a broad range of
shapes for the spread curve.




t by OLS, using U.S. and Euro area bond
yields. Throughout, we follow Diebold and Li (2006) by setting the parameter λ =0 .714,s o
that the term multiplying β3 in all countries’ spread curves is maximized when n =2 1
2 years.
Then, given a set of parameters β
i
t, we use equation (24) to price each of country i’s bonds






























t refers to r$
t if the bond is denominated in U.S. dollars, or r∗
t = r€
t if the bond is
denominated in a European currency.
We estimate the parameters β
i
t by nonlinear least squares to minimize the sum of squared
deviations of the predicted prices, pi
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where the summation is taken over all bonds issued by country i w i t hp r i c e sa v a i l a b l ea td a t e
t. As discussed in Svensson (1994), minimizing yield to maturity errors rather than price
45errors gives a better ﬁt for short-term yields to maturity, because short-term bond prices are
less sensitive to their yields to maturity than long-term bond prices.
The following features present in the data require modiﬁcation of the basic bond pricing
equation (24):
1. Between coupon periods, the quoted price of a bond does not include accrued interest,
so we subtract from the bond price the portion of the next coupon’s value that is
attributed to accrued interest.
2. For bonds with principal payments guaranteed by U.S. Treasury securities, we discount
the payment of principal by the risk-free yield only, without the country spread.
3. For bonds with coupon payments that increase or decrease over time with certainty
(“step-up” and “step-down” bonds, respectively), we modify the sequence of payments
in equation (24) accordingly.
Table 12 below displays root mean squared errors (RMSE), as a percentage of a bond’s
price. Errors are moderate, averaging three to seven percent of actual bond prices across the
four countries. During periods when spreads are high, errors tend to be larger; for example,
the RMSE of Russian bonds is 11 percent in periods when the 2-year spread is above its 90th
percentile.
Table 12: Average Root Mean Squared Errors
average RMSE percentile of 2-year spread
(% of price) < 10th < 25th < 50th ≥ 50th ≥ 75th ≥ 90th
Argentina 5.4795 3.2470 3.3146 3.6243 7.3347 9.1872 13.2562
Brazil 6.0731 6.2179 6.1681 5.6921 6.4521 7.3479 8.2165
Mexico 2.6303 2.2326 2.2762 2.4946 2.7654 2.9852 3.2437
Russia 7.2242 4.2919 5.7055 6.4463 7.9966 9.6489 11.3806
46Further Statistics on Spread Curves
Tables 13 reports further spread curves and spread volatilities for all countries.
Table 13: Average Spreads and Volatility
Maturity Overall Std. Dev When 2-year spread is above/below nth percentile
(years) (%) < 10th < 25th < 50th ≥ 50th ≥ 75th ≥ 90th
Argentina 2 4.77 6.26 1.10 1.60 2.10 7.44 11.03 19.64
5 5.27 3.83 1.97 2.60 3.24 7.31 9.52 14.54
10 6.22 3.36 3.19 3.77 4.40 8.04 10.00 14.06
15 6.63 3.30 3.70 4.25 4.87 8.39 10.31 14.12
Brazil 2 5.60 5.02 1.69 2.15 2.68 8.51 12.25 18.57
5 6.71 4.41 3.58 3.83 4.18 9.23 12.25 17.07
10 7.14 2.93 4.79 5.25 5.35 8.93 10.84 13.36
15 7.28 2.41 5.24 5.81 5.81 8.75 10.19 11.74
Mexico 2 1.84 1.36 0.42 0.62 0.94 2.74 3.49 4.84
5 2.46 0.97 1.57 1.74 2.01 2.90 3.32 4.45
10 3.45 0.95 2.40 2.60 2.97 3.93 4.28 5.27
15 3.87 0.98 2.72 2.93 3.35 4.40 4.74 5.66
Russia 2 4.44 2.65 1.70 2.03 2.62 6.25 7.88 9.87
5 5.37 2.59 2.86 3.10 3.52 7.22 9.03 10.58
10 5.10 2.25 2.86 2.81 3.39 6.79 8.11 9.36
15 4.92 2.21 2.80 2.62 3.28 6.54 7.62 8.76
47Model’s Debt Price Schedules
Figure 4: Price schedules for short-term and long-term debt when income is at its mean.
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